Scheidler, in his claim against the WA State Bar for RICO activities, is asking the US Federal District Court to take notice of WA Constitutional and Statutory authority and to address the following questions, which have not been addressed by WA State or Federal courts, aka issues of first impression, in light of these constitutional and statutory authorities.
II. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS
1. Scheidler request the Court take notice of Scheidler’s “unabridged” right to petition the court for the common good. See Article 1, Sect 4. At the vortex of this case is Scheidler’s Article 7, Section 10 rights, which is a retired persons right to a property tax exemption – clearly a matter of preeminent pubic importance as Scheidler is not the only ‘retired person’ in WA State. All proceedings herein referenced are a consequence of Scheidler’s effort to address governments’ involvement in denying the Art 7, Sec 10 rights.
2. Scheidler request the court take notice of Scheidler’s “inviolate right to a jury trial” under Article 1, Section 21
3. Scheidler request the court take notice that all political power is inherent in the people as enumerated in Article 1, Section 1.
4. Scheidler request the court take notice of Scheidler’s “statutory right” to establish the common law as enacted by the legislature in RCW 4.04.010 as the means by which 1, 2, and 3 noted above manifest thorough trials by jury in both civil and criminal cases. Said another way – If this case involves a matter of “first impression, or governments just powers” the “people via a jury” must establish the common law as ALL political power resides with them and governments’ derive their “just powers” from the people.
5. Scheidler request the court take notice that Scheidler has “immunity” from the “administrative” rules the courts’ establish for the “government of the courts (Article 4, Sec24)” and “to prescribe rules of procedure and practice in the courts.” This “immunity” from “court rules” is intended by Congress in enacting 28 U.S. Code § 2072 and by the WA Legislature enacting RCW 4.32.250 and RCW 4.36.240. See also RAP 1.2.
6. Scheidler ask this Court take notice that WA “judges are distinguished from court” as WA law expressly states in RCW 2.28.050. [See Article 4, Section 6, RCW 2.08.010, clearly “distinguishing courts from judges”…..
“Said courts and their judges shall have power to issue writs of mandamus, quo warranto, review, certiorari, prohibition, and writs of habeas corpus, on petition by or on behalf of any person in actual custody in their respective counties. Injunctions and writs of prohibition and of habeas corpus may be issued and served on legal holidays and nonjudicial days.”]
7. Scheidler ask this Court take notice that “The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, superior courts, justices of the peace, and such inferior courts as the legislature may provide.” In other words, “judicial power” is in the courts NOT with judges who only have statutory powers – See Article 4, Section 1.
8. Scheidler request the Court take notice that judges must disqualify for conflict – actual conflict or appearance of conflict — under law and code of judicial conduct. 28 U.S. Code § 455; RCW 2.28.030 – Disqualification; CJC 2.11 – disqualification of State judges, and Canon 3(c) of the code of conduct for federal judges.
9. Scheidler request the Court take notice that state law and common law shall be the rules of decision in civil actions. 28 U.S. Code § 1652 – State laws as rules of decision; RCW 4.04.010- common law as rule of decisions
VII. DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT QUESTIONS PRESENTED [I.E., QUESTIONS OF FIRST IMPRESSION]
25. How does a victim obtain relief from a Mafia-type enterprise that operates in the courts, makes the rules by which they operate, interprets the rules they make and sit as decision makers of these rules all the while masquerading as a “court” which is statutorily distinguished from “judges”? In other words, how does a judge become the court to decide his own conduct?
26. Define what protections and rights citizens have when those charged with adjudication and prosecution of criminal acts are the very people committing the crimes against the citizen?
27. How does Plaintiff obtain counsel in a jurisdiction and venue that is composed only of members of the WA State Bar who can threaten and intimidate.
28. How can justice be served in a system of self-regulation that has allowed the WA State Bar the power to protect lawyers that violate their oath and violate the rules of professional conduct.
29. How can a “grievant” — who files a Bar grievance against a lawyer for the lawyers violation of laws and rules of professional conduct, who is then delegated by the Bar the task of obtaining a “judicial finding of impropriety” — obtain a judicial finding of impropriety if there are no impartial procedures established by the courts for this cause of action.
30. Should a grievant who uses the existing ‘court rules’ to obtain a “judicial finding of impropriety” as delegated by the WA State Bar, be “sanctioned under court rules” for doing what the Bar delegated to the grievant.
31. How can a common law doctrine of “judicial immunity” occur if the WA legislature is prohibited in granting immunities, [See Article 1, Section 12 and Article 2, Section 28], the WA Constitution abolished heredity privileges, [see Article 1, Sec 28], and a judge cannot sit on a case in which he is directly interested [See RCW 2.28.030].
32. How can a citizen obtain relief for judicial misconduct when judges have granted themselves immunity, violate the rules they establish, and sit on cases in which they are interested in the rules they make and the laws they violate, and behave as a “court” when judges are “distinguished from courts”.